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This paper introduces a logic game which can be used to demonstrate 
the working of Boolean connectives. The simplicity of the system turns 
out to lead to some interesting meta-theoretical properties, which them-
selves carry a philosophical import. After introducing the system, we 
demonstrate an interesting feature of it—that it, while being an accurate 
model of propositional logic Booleans, does not contain any tautologies 
nor contradictions. This result allows us to make explicit a limitation of 
application of propositional logic to those sentences with relatively stable 
truth values.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we imagine fi rst introducing (propositional) logic to a 
rational thinker via a simple logic game. It will be obvious this is a per-
fectly adequate way of explaining the Boolean connectives. At the same 
time, however, the bare-bones simplicity of the system will turn out to 
lead to some interesting meta theoretical properties, which themselves 
carry a philosophical import. That philosophical import has to do with 
the truths of logic, and the high rank these occupy among things we 
can know a priori (cf. Boghossian 2003, Harman 1996, Kitcher 1980, 
Peacocke 2005). It is useful to think that “[...] in general a logical truth 
is a statement which is true and remains true under all reinterpreta-
tions of its components other than the logical particles.” (Quine 1961: 
22–23). Sticking to propositional logic and the paradigmatic case of the 
law of excluded middle, P∨「P, this idea would mean that this proposi-
tion’s truth depends only on the logical symbols ‘∨’ and ‘「’ or, in other 
words, is independent of what P might be (as long as it is a proposi-
tion). The properties of this system cast a doubt on that notion. In the 
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following section of this paper, we will present the system in question, 
and its connection with propositional logic. In the central section, we 
demonstrate its meta-theoretical properties. Finally, the closing sec-
tion of this paper takes a slightly bigger-picture perspective with an 
examination of the philosophical implications of the system.
2. Lock-Key game
The system at hand is presented in a form of a logic puzzle, one that 
asks whether a certain key opens a certain lock. Drawing inspiration 
from a computer infrastructure, locks are built of elements closely re-
sembling logic gates, but with symbols altered to resemble the stan-
dard notation of Booleans in logic, including a specifi c orientation of 
the notation.
2.1 Lock elements
Lock consist of three kinds of elements, each with two subtypes: circles, 
squares and triangles, determined by the number of connections they 
have to other elements (one, two and three, respectively).
 Defi nition 1 (Circle) Circle elements are the input/output ele-
ments of the lock. A number of Input circles are located at the 
bottom (i.e. “beginning”) of the lock, and a single Output circle is 
located at the top (i.e. “end”) of the lock. Note that a lock by defi -
nition contains only one output (and does in fact contain one).
Graphically we represent these elements as:
Fig. 1: Circle elements
 Defi nition 2 (Square) Square elements have two connections—
the one below considered its input and the one above considered 
its output. The types of this kind of an element are labeled Same 
and Other.
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Graphically we represent these elements as:
Fig. 2: Square elements
 Defi nition 3 (Triangle) Triangle elements have three connec-
tions—the two below are considered its input and the one above 
considered its output. The types of this kind of an element are 
labeled Minimum and Maximum.
Graphically we represent these elements as:
Fig. 3: Triangle elements
Note that Squares and Triangles are all functions, i.e. for any input 
they have only one output. The purpose of the Square element Same is 
purely for the sake of legibility, and will be discussed in the next sec-
tion. The reader is probably aware of the purpose of the elements Oth-
er, Minimum and Maximum, but let us just note here that the shape 
of the latter two were chosen to facilitate memorization—Minimum is 
the widest at the bottom of the element, while Maximum is widest at 
the top.
We now proceed to introduce another element of the game—the 
keys, which serve as the primary input for the whole structure of a lock.
2.2 Key elements
 Defi nition 4 (Key) A key is an ordered n-tuple v1 … vn where 
vi . A key is a key to a lock 𝓛 just in case n is the number of 
input elements of the lock 𝓛.
After introducing the elements, we now put them all together to de-
scribe how the “game” is played.
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2.3 Building a lock
 Defi nition 5 (Lock building procedure) A lock is built bottom up, 
and starts with a number of Input elements. We then add the 
other elements, with each of their inputs coming from an output 
of a lower element, and fi nally we add an Output element. The 
elements that some element ε gets its input from are called the 
immediate predecessors of ε.
Two limitations are that the output of each Square and Triangle is an 
input of some other element and that there is only one Output element.
In case we wish to consider only certain sections of a lock, we refer 
to them as sublocks:
 Defi nition 6 (Sublock) Any element is a part of the same sublock 
as itself. If an element is part of a sublock, then the element(s) it 
gets its input from are also parts of the same sublock. We refer 
to sublocks as sublocks of their topmost element.
Example 7 An example of a correctly built lock is the following:
Fig. 4: An example of a lock
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2.4 Semantics of the game
After introducing the lock and key elements, we now proceed to defi ne 
their interactions:
 Defi nition 8 (Semantics) The elements of a lock 𝓛  produce the 
values as follows. Going from left to right, the Input element i 
takes the value vi from the key to the lock 𝓛. The element Same 
produces as its output the same value as it input, element Other 
produces the other value than its input, Maximum produces the 
greater of the two values in its input, and Minimum the lower. 
Finally, if the Output element takes the value 1 we take the lock 
to be “opened,” and “closed” otherwise.
Example 9 Going back to the example lock from the Example 7, the 
only key to produce an “open” lock would be  . It is left as an 
exercise to the reader to verify this.
2.4.1 Connection to propositional logic
It should be clear to the reader that
 Observation 10 The semantics of the elements Other, Maximum 
and Minimum are precisely those of the Booleans Not, Or and 
And, respectively.
As an illustration, the Example 9 above would correspond to the for-
mula (A∧B)∧「(C∨D) with the main connective being the conjunc-
tion, the left conjunct being a further conjunction, and the right one a 
negation of a disjunction. It is again left as an exercise to the reader to 
verify this formula is assigned 1 only when the variables A, B, C and D 
are assigned the values 1, 1, 0, 0, respectively.
Given this, it should be clear how this game will allow our thinker to 
understand propositional logic. We can also see why the element Same 
might be useful, as it refl ects the idea that a subformula (which itself 
corresponds to a sublock) is assigned a value, but that value gets picked 
up by some other connective at a later stage. One can further utilize the 
game to introduce the semantic tables by considering how many possible 
keys there are for each lock. Note also that the shape of the triangle ele-
ments, while making sense in the context of Minimum and Maximum, 
also make it easier to distinguish the common disjunction and conjunc-
tion symbols.
We will now proceed to consider some metatheoretical properties of 
the game.
3. Metatheory of the game
As we have seen in the Example 7, all but one possible key produced a 
closed lock. The question that now arises is whether we can take this 
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one step further by building a lock that is “unopenable.”1 Note that:
 Observation 11 This question is equivalent to asking whether 
we can have a lock which all keys open, since we can transform 
one into the other by adding one Other element just before the 
Output element.
To encompass both of these, we will use the expression “forced.” 
 Defi nition 12 (Forcing a lock) A lock can be forced if it can be 
made in such a way as to produce the same output for any pos-
sible key.
The answer to the former question is simply ‘No’ and the demonstra-
tion of this fact will be the central result of this paper.
 Theorem 13 No lock in the Lock-Key game can be forced.
Proof. By showing no sublock can be forced, by induction on the last 
element.
Basic case. Input elements cannot be forced, by Defi nition 8.
Inductive case. If the last element is Same, its sublock can only be 
forced if the sublock of its immediate predecessor is forced. If the last 
element is Other, its sublock can likewise only be forced if the sublock 
of its immediate predecessor is forced, given Observation 11. Similarly 
for the Triangle elements, we can only force them if we can force the 
sublocks of their immediate predecessors.
Given Observation 10, it is clear that an unopenable lock would cor-
respond to a contradiction, and a lock that every key opens to tautology.
In light of this, an interesting corollary follows:
 Corollary 14 Lock-Key system contains no tautologies and no 
contradictions.
4. Philosophical import
What, if any, is the philosophical lesson and importance of this result? 
To see this, let us consider how to reconcile the apparent strain that 
exists between Observation 10 and Corollary 14. After all, the former 
tells us the elements of the game correspond to the Booleans, but those, 
in opposition to the corollary, do produce tautologies and contradic-
tions (given our choice of the Booleans, the examples we’ll focus on are 
P∨「P and P∧「P). The result that resolves the discrepancy, and is 
the main, if modest (given the limited scope of this paper) philosophical 
claim of this paper is the following:
 Theorem 15 It is not the case that the tautologies [contradic-
tions] of propositional logic are true [false] purely in virtue of the 
Booleans occurring in them.
1 The author owes gratitude to Dragana Sekulić for bringing this question to 
their attention.
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Proof. To see this, one should only note that the locks also contain Input 
elements, which correspond to the propositional variables. However, 
the semantics of these elements are not exactly alike—recalling the 
basic step of the proof of Theorem 13, Input elements cannot be forced. 
But the propositional variables can—the second occurrence of the vari-
able P in either the example tautology or contradiction can have only 
one value—that of the fi rst occurrence. This difference reveals an ad-
ditional ingredient one needs to “cook up” a sentence of propositional 
logic that is always true or false—a certain type of behavior of the prop-
ositional variable(s).
Note that this argument does not show, nor does it in fact intend to 
do so, that the law of excluded middle (or the law of non-contradiction) 
is not true. Therefore, it is not a version of a “deviant logician” argu-
ment (cf. Williamson 2006, Sullivan 2014). The Lock-Key system cor-
responds to a system without a very basic, and by and large implicit, 
feature of propositional logic, that the propositional variables do not 
alter their value within an assignment. Such a system could be, e.g. 
one where we use a propositional variable only once in a formula. Alter-
natively, it could be one with such assignments which would allow the 
change of value while a formula is in use. This isn’t entirely far-fetched, 
e.g. “I never wrote this sentence before.” Rather, it just illustrates that 
logic is more regimented than we normally notice.
In explaining logic to our thinker using this game, we will have to 
explicitly and separately introduce limitations on the truth values of 
propositional variables. The very fact that the system is so basic allows 
it to make this feature of propositional logic apparent.
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